

NOTE FOR: CIA Officials Attending [REDACTED]
Thursday, 5 October 1978 Briefing

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[REDACTED] plan to reorganize the Compartmentation Structures proposes and raises the following questions:

a. Collectors can make the decision on what is to be compartmented if it passes a test definition of compartmentation. Policing this action is the responsibility of men of good will and honest intention and The Security Committee.

Questions:

1. Will the collectors be able to retain any form of compartmentation about the R&D and operational aspects of collection? For example, will the NRO still compartment knowledge about operational features of [REDACTED]

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2. If so will they make the determination of who has the need-to-know authority.

3. Who will certify operational compartmentation clearances between NSA and the NRO.

4. In the case of NSA, which now sets all policy and puts everything that is associated with collection in a compartment, will they be able to continue to do this?

5. In the case of [REDACTED] will they continue to have unquestioned authority to compartment operations and require all members of the community to get approval for clearances? 25X1

6. Does this program (as it relates to compartmentation of operations - not product) eliminate the need for a central index of people who are cleared for knowledge about operational projects such as SI [REDACTED]

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7. Does this system do away with the SI and [REDACTED] system completely?

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b. Per [REDACTED] plan, collectors are to view all product of the operations and do two things:

- (1) Put as much product out under rules of CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, TOP SECRET.
- (2) Compartment under generic codewords material that passes the definition for compartmentation.

Questions:

1. Is there any day-to-day check on what the collectors decide goes into compartmentation?

2. Will there be any compartmentation of product while people look at it to see if it should be compartmented? If so, what clearances will they have?

3. Do you see potential for two different groups, CIA and DIA, looking at the same photograph and arriving at different determinations whether to compartment? If so, does your proposal address a solution?

4. Is there any recourse in your proposal for the consumer to appeal the collectors decision to compartment or not to compartment? If so, what?

5. Your plan calls for the generic compartmentation under 8 codewords of product that does not reveal sources.

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6. To what extent will need for analyst access to source data for purposes of weighing items of product against one another increase the number of accesses to operational compartment above present levels?

7. Will system be structured so that product may not be compartmented unless collector makes specific burden of proof determination to do so? If so, what records will collectors be required to maintain for review under a policing system?

8. Who will balance competing claims by collectors for protection versus consumers for non-compartmented wide dissemination?

9. What place does your plan have for dissemination and use restrictions (e.g., ORCON, WNINTEL, NOCONTRACT) as an intermediate level of protection between classification per se and compartmentation? If none, wouldn't such decrease protection of moderately sensitive information increase administration burdens through added compartmentation, or both?

10. E.O. 12065 (Section 4-2) permits special access programs (i.e., compartments) for intelligence to be used only with DCI approval following satisfaction of tests stated in the Order. Under your plan, who would advise the DCI on whether a proposed compartment meets those tests? If each collector is to do so, how would the DCI be assured that the advice he gets is of uniform character?

STAT 11. How would your plan operate to "purify" operational compartments of essentially administrative information not bearing directly on extremely sensitive compartmentation (e.g., fact of [redacted] thereby reducing spillover sensitivity considerations for product and permitting reduction in number of accesses to residual operational data?

STAT 12. To what extent do you expect your plan will result in material now held in internal privacy channels (e.g., [redacted] to be released to other agencies even subject to product compartmentation controls?